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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
Because my intent for this paper is to strategically analyze the current 
opportunities for entering the pay-televsion (pay-TV) market in Chile, I 
have utilized the most recent and cogent sources available to me in the 
Benson Latin American Collection, UT-LANIC, and the Perry Castañeda 
Library, each of the University of Texas at Austin. Sources include, but are 
not limited to, government publications, industry-related websites, trade 
papers, scholarly journals, and reference books. Where possible I support 
articles taken from popular sources such as industry reports, newspapers 
and magazines with articles from more scholarly sources such as academic 
journals and books. The Chilean pay-TVmarket is still in its infancy and 
trade papers such as the entertainment industry newspaper Variety, and the 
magazines Cablevision and Multichannel News, tend to provide the most 
timely information on both the Chilean and Latin American pay-television 
markets. Business reference sources such as the newsletter Business in Latin 
America, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, provide reliable, 
respected and time-relevant, business and country statistics and are also 
used to a great degree in the report. 
INTRODUCTION 
Television first emerged in postwar Latin America as a status symbol of the 
rich. By the 1970's it had become a staple of the middle class; and by 1990, 
the urban poor had access to it in many Latin American countries. Lynn H. 
Roberts, a journalist writing for U.S./Latin Trade in 1995 stated, 
'Television, the world's most democratic form of entertainment, is changing 
life in Latin America." Local broadcast options have snowballed, and pay-
TV, where viewers have more choices, is booming. Many options exist, and 
more arrive as technology develops and infrastructure is provided, so much 
so that networks are expecting a shakeout, a consolidation and a leveling-off 
of options. As United States pay-TV firms look to bring franchises abroad, 
Latin America is proving to be market-ready for some cable programmers 
and operators. However, the pay-TV markets in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico are already near, or have surpassed, saturation, thus this paper 
recommends that firms looking to get a head start on the competition should 
consider the comparatively mature, and safe Chilean pay-TV market. 
The paper has three main sections. The first offers a brief explanation of the 
pay-TV industry as it pertains to this paper. The second discusses Chile's 
market potential relative to the Latin American region as a whole. The third 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the national market in Chile, 
covering the environmental factors of political and economic risk, 
infrastructure, education, and labor issues, as well as programming and 
advertising issues. A conclusion follows. 
The Pay-TV Industry 
For the purposes of this paper, the pay-TV industry is loosely defined as a 
media service industry providing either entertainment programming or 
operations through cable or satellite dishes. I chose this loose definition 
because although the cable televison industry is relatively mature, the direct 
broadcast satellite industry is still in a nascent period, and because there is a 
rapidly growing synergy among telecommunications projects that has yet to 
receive an industry standard delineation. It must also be noted that Chile, 
although it is wired for cable in some areas and has a fairly mature market, 
still has market potential for a mixture of telecommunications options such 
as direct-to-home (DTH) television, fiber optic cabling, telephony and many 
others-thus a loose definition fits the market. 
Before I discuss the national market for pay-TV in Chile, a brief 
explanation of the industry as it effects Chile is necessary. To understand 
what it is happening with new cable and satellite technologies requires far 
more space than is possible to include in this report. However, any 
understanding begins with an awareness of the basic elements at work. 
At the heart of the pay-TV market in Chile is the marriage of cable 
television and satellite communication. These two elements have now 
combined with computers and dozens of new home video and telephone 
products to produce the communications revolution that is sweeping Latin 
America. 
For this paper, I have broken the industry down into generalized building 
blocks. The first distinction to be made is between cable operators and cable 
programmers: a cable operator runs the service, and a cable programmer 
provides the content. 
Pay-TV companies offer a multiplicity of special-program channels as part 
of their basic service. These channels are called networks, because just like 
the U.S. stations, ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox, they can be received 
simultaneously across a country or region. Networks generally come in 
packaged form, and a basic cable package may have 20-25 channels of this 
type. (As the number of channels increases with different types of 
programming, so does the cost). A second type of network is the premium 
channel, such as HBO, Showtime and Cinemax. Subscribers to these 
services pay a fee above the basic charge, for these services. In addition to 
the premium channels there are even more expensive pay-per-view (PPV) 
channels, which tend to carry programs that are not yet available for 
premium channels or networks. Subscribers pay a one-time fee to watch 
these programs. 
A new technology, still in its infancy but growing at a rapid rate is direct-to-
home television. DTH-TV involves a small satellite dish called a direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS), and a decoder box. Depending on the technology 
of the decoder box the subscriber can receive a large number (100+) of 
networks, premium channels and PPV, as well as digital audio music 
signals through the dish. 
DTH-TV is not only changing the way people watch television, it is 
changing the way cable operators function. It is a boon for areas plagued by 
infrastructure problems-with little more than an satellite dish, a decoder 
box, and a power source, DTH-TV can beam hundreds of channels into a 
home, whether it be in metropolitan Santiago, the high-points of the Andes, 
or in the baked sand of the Atacama desert. 
Another high-stakes issue in the Latin American market is whether 
telephone and telecommunication companies will be allowed to move into 
cable television services, and vice versa. In Argentina, the largest per capita 
cable television market in Latin America (Brazil has the largest market), 
there are as many TV cables as telephone lines, and the next step for 
industry is to venture into data-transmission and the Internet. Cable TV 
programmers can then use either television or telephone lines to act as 
Internet providers and at the same time can advertise their programming 
schedules and the like. 
Due to deregulation, competition in Chile is fierce. Cable's future will thus 
involve expanding existing operations while providing new information 
services to customers, such as those mentioned above. To accomplish this 
multiple system operators (MSOs) are also experimenting with digital video 
compression, multiplexing, smart TV and other interactive technologies. 
Mulitplexing involves providing a single program service on several 
different channels, such as HBO, HBO2, and HBO3. All run the same 
programming, but at different starting times. DTH uses this technology to a 
successful degree. 
The Pay-TV Market in Latin America 
The key to success in the pay-TV industry is differentiation, and to 
differentiate itself in the Chilean marketplace a firm needs to establish an 
exclusive identity. Entering the Latin American pay-TV market is prudent 
only if a firm recognizes that the region is not one single, homogenous 
market beginning at the Rio Grande river in Mexico and extending South to 
Tierra del Fuego in Chile. Latin American countries and their attached 
markets contain an enormous number of differing characteristics. Each 
country has difficulties and opportunities that are distinct; especially in the 
pay-TV sphere. The most important difference is that there are Latin 
American markets, such as Chile, where systems do not enjoy the type of 
geographic monopoly seen in the U.S. Thus far, this is something 
international programmers have chosen to ignore or have failed to perceive. 
However, geographic exclusivity is not the only key to success in pay-TV 
markets, and this section offers evidence that Chile is a comparatively 
strong pay-TV market in regards to the rest of Latin America for economic, 
technical, and competitive reasons. 
Economically, Chile is arguably the safest country in Latin America to start 
business ventures. The Chilean economy, like its Mercosur partner markets, 
has done well in recent years, causing it to be regarded as the jewel of Latin 
American markets by international investors. 
Although pay-TV penetration is still low in Latin America, ad revenues 
topped US$15 billion in 1996, and the privatization of channels, easing of 
restrictions on cable and satellite services, and increasing protection for 
intellectual property are providing an hospitable, and profitable atmosphere 
of growth. An increasing number of channels means a higher demand for 
programs which translates into opportunities for U.S. producers and 
distributors to generate additional revenue by forming joint ventures with 
their Latin American counterparts. 
But why enter the market in Chile, if the market is so strong elsewhere why 
not go pan-regional to start? Because, with at least 30 U.S. channels in play, 
and at least that many U.S. and local networks maneuvering to join the fray, 
many firms are finding that pay-TV is not a short-term, fast-buck market. 
Distribution, and differentiation are the key to success, but many cable 
boxes are still limited to 30 channels. Despite the potential for a large ad 
market, there is some inertia there, and pay-TV firms must face, maturing, 
but unpredictable economies. Pay-TV firms looking to enter the Latin 
American market can expect to have to convince skeptical advertisers by 
spending big money on viewer research, and to set break-even targets for 
anywhere from 3 years to 5 years or more (the 3 year targets have been 
called best case-scenarios). 
Industry sources agree that Latin America is about 15 to 20 years behind the 
U.S. market and has much lower penetration, and bigger programmers are 
hogging the revenue trough. Programmers with several networks owned by 
parent companies such as Time Warner and Sony took in returns in excess 
of US$50 million to US$90 million in 1996. Most channels scrape by on 
less than US$10 million a piece. With operating costs in start-up years 
typically surpassing US$10 million, most pay-TV firms can expect to start, 
and stay, in the red for a number of years. 
Despite the factors mentioned above, or perhaps more clearly, due to the 
factors mentioned above, the best reason for entering the Chilean market is 
this-a market shakeout is expected for Latin America. The hardest hit 
markets will be those with the most competition, thus a firm in Chile is 
more likely to weather the shakeout than one in a market like Argentina or 
Brazil. In addition, the overall economy and audience of Chile is 
comparatively secure, and is thus a firm focused on that region is more 
likely to survive a shakeout and be able to act on any lucrative possibilties 
created by a shakeout. 
Investing in pay-TV in Latin America means banking on future growth, and 
Chile is poised for it. In 1996 Chile had a population of 14.6 million, 
divided into 4 million households, with 3.5 million households having 
televisions. There were 500,000 pay-TV subscribers (cable, wireless, and 
DTH-TV) and the TV ad market was US$142 million. In 1994 Chile saw 
two pay-TV deals happen for US$64 million. In 1995 the number of deals 
expanded to three for US$148 million. The room for growth is still there, 
and Chile also has a strong market for related entertainment options, which 
are signs that the market for entertainment services is growing with the 
success of the economy. For instance, there is an original production movie 
and television business in Chile, and despite rising ticket costs and 
decreasing box office figures, Chile is one of Latin America's major film 
markets. The 1995 box office figures for Chile were $US 18 million, with 
an attendance figure of 6 million people at 126 screens with a top ticket 
price of $6.10. 
There is also room for growth in the pan-regional advertising market. 
Convincing a company to advertise on cable television in Latin America a 
few years ago was a difficult sell. The number of cable subscribers-- 9.8 
million, or 13 percent of available households-- was low. Service by local 
cable operators was poor, technical difficulties were common, the range of 
programming was limited, and the economic crisis spawned by the peso 
devaluation in Mexico had hurt the spending power of many Latin 
Americans. This is no longer the case. Cable operators are busy investing in 
new technologies. Customer service is seeing a turnaround, and 
programming choices are growing. Half a dozen new cable channels have 
been launched since the middle of 1996, including Nickelodeon, Discovery 
Kids, Fox Kids, and CNN en Español. One startling example of growth is 
this, in 1993, Variety published a Latin America satellite fact sheet which 
showed 25 satellite channels operating in Latin American markets. By 1994 
there were 56 channels; by 1996, 74. 
Despite those numbers, cable penetration, or the actual number of 
households those channels legally reach is still low-- 10.7 million, or about 
13.3 percent of available households. But advertising growth rates are a 
positive sign that interest in cable and other related media is growing. For 
instance, in 1995 Chileans spent US$1.1 billion on advertising, 9.5 percent 
more than in 1994. Department stores were the biggest spenders, followed 
by the telecommunications industry, car companies, the government, soft 
drinks and beer. Companies spent US$603 million of that pie, using 46.3 
percent of spending on television ads. It should be noted that although 
companies are spending more on advertisements, the business is still small 
compared with more developed countries. But on a pan-regional level, 
international advertising agencies are following their clients to Latin 
America looking to service current clients who are investing in the region as 
well as local companies already under operation, despite the fact that a pan-
regional advertising strategy is still not completely feasible because of 
diverging regulations and localized media. However, as the pay-TV 
industry becomes more competitive Latin America's advertising industry 
will continue to see a boom. The region already leads global markets in 
spending on GDP (1.3 percent), and an average annual growth of 13.4 
percent should be seen over the next three years. 
The economic recovery of many countries, combined with new technologies 
such as DTH-TV has started a turnaround in the Latin American pay-TV 
business. DTH-TV has raised the stakes in the pay-TV game, forcing cable 
operators to improve customer service and encouraging U.S. cable networks 
to introduce new channels. A U.S.-based research company, the Strategis 
Group, estimates that 44 million homes, or 30 percent of available Latin 
American households will be reached by cable and satellite industries by 
2005. That should translate into US$20 billion in annual revenue, versus US
$3 billion in 1995. However, the proliferation of cable channels coming into 
the Latin American market increases the propensity for a shakeout. 
Technically, Chile is prepared for modern telecommunications options. One 
of the most likely options for the near-term success of the Chilean pay-TV 
market is the aforementioned DTH-TV market. Because of its flexibility, 
DTH-TV has tremendous potential for Chile, as well as the rest of Latin 
America. It is expected to help grow the pay-TV industry as a whole, and by 
the year 2000, the DTH-TV market should be worth an expected US$5.8 
billion. The only current barrier to the formats success is the price to the 
user. The cost of a decoder box can range from US$400 to $995, depending 
on the country and its tariff structure, and depending on the package of 
channels and services, the monthly rate can range from US$20 to US$50. 
Competitively, Chile is a mature, but less-saturated market than the three 
biggest Latin American markets, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The 
medium of television, seen as a business unto itself, is rapidly changing 
Latin America. United States and European cable broadcasters are wiring 
up, or beaming to, millions of homes. The foreign-produced cartoons, sports 
events, documentaries and movies as well as the Latin American produced 
telenovelas are taking over Latin American entertainment markets, but in 
Chile, a pay-TV firm would be up against less competition than the three 
aforementioned countries. 
Products like DTH-TV, digital programming, and other emerging 
technologies, are making the cable-television industry an exceedingly 
competitive, global game. A company can be headquartered anywhere, it 
just needs a service or possibly sales department in the host country. 
For example, one of the most watched networks in Latin America, CBS's 
Telenoticias, began when a global coalition of news providers savvy to the 
region saw a market for a cable news channel. A joint venture was started in 
1994 between Reuter's (United Kingdom), Telemundo (USA), Antena 3 
(Argentina), and Artear. However, the new network soon found itself in 
financial straits, and none of the partners wanted to open up their coffers for 
further investment. Westinghouse/CBS, seeing a potential profit, dug into 
its deep pockets, taking the network off of the joint venture's hands in June 
1996. It now has 10 million viewers, a large customer base, with big 
families in a population dominated by the young. Add sales are up 300 
percent since it was bought, and a Portuguese-language network will soon 
start for Brazil. 
Two other major competitors in the Latin American pay-TV game are 
competing for the DTH-TV market: Galaxy Latin America, and Sky 
Entertainment Services Latin America. Galaxy is a partnership between 
DirecTV International (a unit of US-based Hughes Electronics), the 
Cisneros Group (Venezuela), TVA (Brazil), and MVS Multivisión 
(Mexico). Last July the company started service to Brazil and Venezuela, 
later expanding into Mexico, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Barbados. By adding Chile, Colombia and Argentina within 
the middle of 1997, Galaxy will cover 90 percent of Latin America. The 
partnership has invested between US$500 to $550 million in the venture; it 
hopes to break even within three and a half years. Galaxy currently charges 
between $300 and $599 for a decoder box and between $22 and $40 for 
monthly rates. As new technologies are developed and DTH-TV becomes 
more commonplace, the cost is predicted to drop-to prices comparable to 
VCRs ($200) within 5 years. 
Sky Entertainment Services Latin America is a partnership consisting of 
Organizações Globo (Brazil), Grupo Televisa (Mexico), News Corp. 
(Rupert Murdoch), and Tele-Communications International (USA). Sky 
began service in Brazil last October and in Mexico last December. It plans 
to add Chile, Argentina, and Colombia in the first half of 1997, and the 
balance of the region shortly thereafter. This cost $540 million ($200 
million raised through a debt offering for the Brazilian launch). Sky charges 
from $450 to $995 for a decoder box and $45 to $50 in monthly fees. 
Operators contend that the high cost of launching DTH-TV in Latin 
America will pay off, even if only the well-off can afford it. But, DTH-TV 
providers do feel the threat of an oncoming shakeout. As the pay-TV 
business matures, it becomes less profitable; however, with DTH-TV the 
more the market is penetrated the higher the margins. Adding customers 
comes at a marginal cost. DTH-TV proponents argue that cable operators 
will have to move to digital systems and provide stronger service to 
compete with the quality of DTH-TV. 
Direct-broadcast satellite service DirecTV received approval to begin 
operations in Chile by that country's office of the Subsecretary of 
Telecommunications of the Transportation and Telecommunications 
Ministry in December of 1996. The government granted a license to a local 
operating company, VTR Galaxy Chile (a local operating company of 
Galaxy Latin America), to receive and distribute DirecTV. DirecTV is the 
first DTH home entertainment service in the country. Service was expected 
to start in early 1997, with over 100 channels from the U.S., Europe, Asia 
and Latin America; service actually began on 18 March 1997. There are 
more than 50 video channels, 33 audio channels, and 2000 hours of 
programming from Latin America, Europe, Asia, and the US. 
The following section takes a broader look at the positive and negative 
points of the overall Chilean market. 
The Chilean Pay-TV Market 
This section is divided into five subsections. The first offers a brief and 
general history of the pay-TV market in Chile, and the other four cover 
environmental factors: political risk, economic risk, infrastructure, 
education, labor and competition issues, as well as programming and 
advertising issues. These issues are important to consider because in order 
to stay competitive in Chile pay-TV programmers and operators will have 
to be sensitive to Chile's economic, political and cultural environment. The 
Chilean pay-TV market must be seen as a long-term investment. As the 
market crowds with newcomers, as well as new technology, operators and 
programmers will have to be agile to escape to the market's volatility. 
Firms that do not have the agility to escape the market's volatility may find 
it difficult to enter other markets. If a firm promises a certain type of 
service, it must be careful to deliver what is promised, otherwise its 
credibility might be damaged and the likelihood of impairment to the firm's 
chances to gain entry in other Latin American markets will increase. This is 
a particular problem in Latin America, because there is little or no chance 
for heavy penetration both in Chile and in Latin America as a whole, thus 
firms must think in terms of diverse products for a comparatively small base 
of customers. 
A Brief History 
The Chilean television market was created in the early 1960s. It was owned 
and operated either by universities or by the government. There were four 
channels. Channel 11 was run by the University of Chile; channel 14 by the 
Catholic University of Santiago; channel 5 by the Catholic University of 
Valparaíso; and channel 7, the National Channel, was owned by the 
government. The university-based stations gradually became independent, 
but the National Channel remained under the careful watch of the 
government. After the 1973 coup which put Augusto Pincohet in power, all 
television came under government control. University presidents, appointed 
as overseers by the government, controlled the university channels. Like 
everything in Chile at that time, television changed in the years following 
the coup. From 1962 to 1973 television had a small audience; few people 
owned a set and programming was in black and white. Television's impact 
was negligible at best. However, the Pinochet regime molded public 
opinion by disseminating its values, ideology and propoganda through 
television, and as a result television became Chile's national mass medium. 
Today, more than 90 percent of Chilean homes have a television set. 
Programming is of high quality and television is a more common source of 
information than the radio, and even though Chile is a relatively small 
market, it is a prime target for international investors who see it as one of 
the best low-risk growth areas of Latin America. The TV sector is one of 
those growth areas, and the big news there has been the growth of cable 
along with foreign monies flowing into local TV webs 
The first monies to flow into local webs by way of a cable operation in 
Chile started in May 1987. The operation was originally called Mundo cable 
but was renamed Metropolis in 1993. It was largely owned by Argentine 
interests, and in 1994 it reached 25,000 homes in Santiago, and offered 24 
channels. Its major competitor was Intercom, owned by the powerful 
Chilean publishing group, Mercurio. Intercom's history in Chile is a 
troubled one. In the early 1980s U.S. consultants advised Intercom to 
jumpstart the pay-TV industry in Chile by wiring the affluent districts of 
Santiago. However, since the wealthier sectors of society had other options 
for their leisure time, the number of original subscribers was low. (More 
recent experiences show that middle-class neighborhoods are a better target 
area). Another sign of the difficulty, and risk, of starting a pay-TV industry 
in Chile was that the Intercom installations were destroyed by terrorist 
bombs in 1989. 
After its rocky start, Intercom began its service with two channels. By 1993 
it had 16, including HBO-Olé, CNN International, and ESPN. By 1994 it 
had 18,000 subscribers and about 24 channels, including the Discovery 
Channel, MTV Latino, and Gems. A third cable system, Cable Hogar, 
started in 1994 and hoped to reach 10,000 subscribers by years end. There 
was also an over-the-air PPV station owned by the Luksic group, which had 
about 5,000 subscribers and 8 channels. In 1994, Chilean cable was limited 
mostly to Santiago although 109 licenses had been granted by the 
government and sites ranged from the northern town of Arica to the 
southern city of Punta Arenas. Twenty systems operated in the country at 
this time, and before years end 60 more were expected to go on line. 
Despite the early struggles of the pay-TV industry in Chile, the country is a 
comparative oasis when it comes to doing business in Latin America. As 
with all oases though, part of the beauty from afar is a mirage. Chile is 
known as a low-risk environment, and in the following subsections, I argue 
that for the pay-TV industry, Chile has a low political risk factor and a 
moderate economic risk factor. Some may argue that the economic risk is 
also low, and it is in comparison to other developing markets, but not in 
comparison with mature markets such as the United States. 
Political Risk 
Chile is a comparatively stable country with free-market ideology, 
established political institutions, and numerous international links through 
trade agreements and treaties. I contend that political risk for the Chilean 
pay-TV market is low because, from a managerial perspective, political risk 
should be viewed as company-specific rather than country-specific. All 
companies in the same country will not be affected by factors such as 
political instability in the same way. The challenge is to understand the 
sources and types of risk, as well as how they can be handled so that the 
firm is affected in as positive manner. The political risks that the pay-TV 
industry has the potential to face in Chile are regulation due to, or possibly 
to avoid, a market shakeout. Other possible regulatory measures could 
affect content, but a strategic alliance with a local or regional company can 
allay many of these problems. 
Chile is often taken by admirers and critics alike to be a model of neoliberal 
modernization in Latin America in the late twentieth century. It was the first 
country in the region to embrace economic neoliberalism after the 1973 
coup that brought down the socialist coalition government of Salvador 
Allende, and this embrace was also the most thoroughgoing in light of 
Chile's lack of heterodox detours that characterized many other Latin 
American countries throughout the 1980s. In point of fact, Chile's 
adherence to the classical economic development doctrine of liberalization 
and free trade has been so successful in generating high rates of export-led 
growth that its recent economic performance has been favorably compared 
to Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
However, the Chilean experience in neoliberalism is also distinguished from 
those of other Latin American countries in that its economic reforms were 
initiated, carried out, and consolidated largely prior to its transition from the 
Pinochet military regime. The Chilean case thus contradicts much thinking 
that envisions a necessary and causal link between political and economic 
liberalization. 
Regardless of the pathway to reform, Chilean markets are more open than 
ever. (A trade deal with Mercosur was just signed as was a free-trade deal 
with Canada). However, in the short-term, congressional elections have 
been set for December 1997, and slower growth and tight fiscal policies are 
likely to translate into somewhat weaker support for the ruling Concertación 
coalition (despite their strong performance in the municipal elections of 
October 1996, when its share of the vote increased to 55.6 percent from 
1992's 52.1 percent). The dominant Partido Demócratica Cristiano (PDC) 
saw its support lessen to the benefit of its left wing coalition parties. Despite 
these signs of tension within the group, there are also signs of internal 
problems in the main opposition group, Unión por Chile. The tensions in 
both will probably be repressed until 1998, when the prospect of 
presidential elections could lead to serious divisions (and possible high 
profits for news networks covering the melee). Due to constitutional 
changes allowing the government to appoint three unelected senators, the 
ruling coalition should win control of the Senate, despite its level of support 
falling in the house. Political risk is not in question, and the risk to the pay-
TV industry as stated earlier is low. 
Economic Risk 
Latin Americans are embracing pay-TV and its myriad of entertainment 
options, and businesses are, and can still, reap the awards. But, as was 
discussed earlier the anticipated windfall may be cut short by a market 
shakeout, one that the stability and predictability of both the economy and 
government policy in Chile may help firms to weather better than in other, 
more volatile markets. 
Investors in Chile can still count on the best business climate in Latin 
America, despite a Variety of irritating controls. Growth remains the most 
rapid of any major economy in the region, even during a slowdown period. 
Yet, pay-TV companies looking to Chile will face two large challenges in 
1997: the appreciating peso, and the intense competition of certain sectors 
such as telecommunications, retail and banking. The bearing down on 
inflation by the government will reduce import prices, but it will also make 
exporters less competitive, which could effect how consumers decide to 
spend their leisure money. Intense competition will limit the growth of 
profits, even as revenues rise, but trade integration will continue and that 
should bolster the economy for the years to come. 
The economic risk for the pay-TV industry is moderate. The biggest factor 
keeping the risk from being rated low is the small relative size of the market 
and the definite possibility of a pan-regional shakeout. In this subsection I 
offer a general overview of the economy pay-TV firms will face in Chile. 
Issues such as GDP, investment growth, FDI, Central Bank policies, 
government spending, inflation and currency issues are covered. 
Chile's GDP should grow by a respectable 5.2 percent in 1997. The 
slowdown from last year's 6.7 percent reflects a tighter monetary policy to 
correct signs of overheating, lower consumer demand, and slower export 
growth due to a stronger exchange rate. However, looser policy in the 
second half of 1997, along with strong growth in domestic investment, will 
have the economy growing at 6 percent in 1998. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit predicts that the GDP in US$ billion (based on current dollars), will 
grow from $71.7 billion in 1996 to $105.5 billion in 2000. 
Investment growth slowed abruptly in 1996. On an annual basis, overall 
investment in the second quarter was up by only 0.8 percent, compared with 
a 14.9 percent rise in the first quarter. The drop in investment from small- 
and medium-sized businesses was especially marked, as the cost of working 
capital rose in line with higher interest rates. A loosening of monetary 
policy in the second half of 1997 should reverse this process, which should 
lead to a recovery of investment. Chilean banks could be headed for tough 
times, although loan growth has slowed to 11.7 percent in 1996 from 18 
percent in 1995, and consumer credit increased by 34 percent. A changing 
risk profile could make the institutions more vulnerable to the country's 
enforced and relative economic slowdown (including rising 
unemployment). 
FDI was the strongest investment element in 1996, and will be again in 
1997. Total new foreign investment exceeded $6 billion dollars in 1996, a 
42 percent jump from 1995. Mining, a key indicator for the overall 
economy, will continue to attract the most investment in Chile, but 
telecommunications will receive attention as well. Direct foreign investment 
into Chile rose in 1995, but falling portfolio investment offset the increase, 
bringing the overall inflow to $4.3 billion, a 5.5 percent drop over 1994. 
Direct investment increased by 20 percent, to $3.02 billion. The mining 
industry received 57 percent of this; the service industry received 26 
percent; construction received 2 percent; other industries received 10 
percent. Portfolio investment fell to $886 million from $1.64 billion in 
1994. 
In November of 1996, Chilean officials fine-tuned reserve requirements, the 
encaje, on foreign investment in order to smooth the passage of a foreign 
trade deal with Canada. Foreign direct investors will benefit from this 
move. Companies, mostly financial institutions, that brought capital into the 
country to play financial markets, or develop cable television markets will 
not benefit. 
In 1991 the Central Bank imposed its much hated policy to help ward off 
inflows of "hot capital", or foreign portfolio investment, because it was 
thought to be dangerous to stability. Thirty percent of all investment, direct 
or indirect, has to be placed in a one-year, non-interest bearing account with 
the Central Bank. Portfolio investors have to keep dreaming for an end to 
the controls; direct investors will no longer have to abide by the law. 
Foreign investors are favored by the new measures because they 
differentiate between a "productive" and a "financial" investment. 
Productive projects will be exempt from the encaje on direct equity 
investments, although any debt portion of the investment will not be 
exempt. 
Despite a fiscal surplus, government spending is coming under downward 
pressure. At the close of 1996, President Frei ordered that each ministry cut 
its budgeted spending by 1.5 percent, which should lead to a $75 million 
savings next year. Education and transport infrastructure should suffer 
austerity the least, which should help the pay-TV industry by increasing 
possible service routes, and increasing potential viewership. 
Pay-TV firms need to keep a close eye on inflation, as it will affect two key 
aspects of business: the cost of their service, and the ability of the consumer 
to pay for that service. The appreciation of the peso is a sign that inflation is 
a main target of the government for 1997, as are the tightening of monetary 
policy and the cuts in fiscal spending. Progress will be slow, however, given 
the continued indexation of much of the economy. 
The tightening of government monetary policy has hurt credit growth. Short 
term interest rates (measured by the Interbank rate) were allowed to fall by 
the Central Bank from a real 7.5 percent to 7.25 percent at the end of 
January 1997. Further drops will depend on the successful handling of 
inflation. On 21 January 1997, the basket of currencies used to set the 
reference point of Chile's exchange-rate band changed from 10 percent to 
12.5 percent on either side. The dollar now makes up 80 percent of the 
basket (as opposed to 45 percent before). The effect was to provoke an 
immediate nominal appreciation to Ps421: $1, based on a Ps457: $1 central 
peg. The currency could appreciate to as much as Ps400; $1 before 
intervention is started to weaken the peso. The reasoning behind this is the 
reduction of inflationary pressure. 
The Chilean government believed business was expecting too much in 
1996, and in an effort to reel in growth and reduce the possibility for a burst 
of inflation, the government hiked interest rates, targeting a GDP growth of 
6 percent and year in inflation of 6.5 percent. GDP expanded by 8.3 percent 
in 1995, exactly the same as consumer prices. The tighter policy stance of 
1996 was meant to nip inflation in the bud, restraining the inflationary 
expectations of business and sensitive investors. The government did not 
believe that Chile could sustain 1995's high growth rate without spiking 
inflation. 
Infrastructure, Education, Labor and Competition Policy 
Issues regarding infrastructure, education, labor, and competition policy are 
related to political and economic risk, but their relative importance to the 
pay-TV industry makes it necessary to discuss each to a larger degree. 
Infrastructure development is key to the success of the pay-TV industry 
because the programmers rely on telecommunications (cabling and satellite) 
infrastructure to reach operators, and operators rely on those same methods, 
as well as roads, to service the consumer. For geographic reasons, the 
Chilean market is divided between cable and satellite delivery. Chile has an 
area of 292, 135 sq. miles. It occupies the western coast of southern South 
America, and neighbors Peru to the North; Bolivia to the Northeast; 
Argentina to the East. The topography is diverse, and often wild. The Andes 
Mountains rise up from the eastern border and include some of the world's 
highest peaks. To the West is 2,650 miles of Pacific coastline. The Atacama 
Desert is in the North. The center of the country contains its agricultural 
regions, and in the South there are forests and grazing lands. The capital, 
Santiago, with a population of 4.6 million holds the bulk of the country's 
population. The pay-TV market is split by the diversity of this terrain 
because some residents living high in the Andes or in the Atacama do not, 
and cannot without high expense, have cable television. They can however, 
have DTH-TV, thus the market while divided, is actually made larger due to 
new technologies. 
There are an estimated 1.5 million telephones, or one per 9.1 persons in 
Chile. The current telephone system is modern, based on extensive 
microwave radio relay facilities. Domestically, there are extensive 
microwave radio relay links, and a domestic satellite system with 3 earth 
stations. Internationally there are two Intelstat (Atlantic Ocean) satellite 
earth stations. This is significant to the pay-TV industry because as was 
mentioned earlier it is possible that in the coming years both traditional 
telecommunications firms and pay-TV firms will be in competition with 
each other because pay-TV firms will be able to offer telephone services, 
and telecommunications firms will be able to offer pay-TV services. This 
would be done by modifying existing cable conditions. (Internet services 
could be offered as well). 
Other media which compete with pay-TV for consumers are radio and 
broadcast television. In Chile there are an estimated 159 AM radio 
broadcast stations, zero FM stations, 11 shortwave stations, and 131 
television broadcast stations. There is roughly one radio per 3.2 persons. 
However, radio is mainly used by lower classes for entertainment, and 
broadcast channels tend to not have the Variety of programs that cable 
operators would offer the targeted middle class. 
By conservative estimates, $60 billion dollars annually will be required to 
fund Latin America's infrastructure needs through the end of the decade. Of 
the total, $10 billion will be required for telecommunications, $24 billion 
for power projects, and $14 billion for transportation. Each of the 
three areas are important to the pay-TV industry because 
telecommunications covers the infrastructure necessary to deliver the 
product, power to view the product, and transportation to service the 
product. 
However, project financing is evolving painfully slowly in Latin America. 
Investors are becoming bolder as they become familiar with the risk, but 
there is little chance that the stream of funds will become a river within the 
next few years due to the limitations of the commercial banking sector. 
Latin America's huge infrastructure needs will remain largely unmet in the 
near future because of the lack of available financing. 
The biggest problem for Latin America is the side effects of the 1980s debt 
crisis. Commercial banks in developed countries are still required by their 
regulators to make large reserve provisions for any unguaranteed non-
investment grade Latin American exposure. Some progress is being made 
however. Investors are giving up project risk guarantees and taking 
uncovered positions. Some Latin American governments are assuming 
>more risks. 
Chile has no shortage of demand for infrastructure projects. Its near-term 
project finance needs (uncompleted deals suitable for project finance) are 
US$9.2 billion. One problem is that the infrastructure bonanza promised by 
Chile's public works ministry, a total of US$11 billion to the year 2000, 
remains a mirage on the horizon. Only $400 million of toll road 
concessions, for example, were awarded as of fourth quarter 1996, far 
below the governments $1.5 billion goal for the year. Part of this problem is 
the usual bureaucratic foot-dragging. A bigger challenge is arranging the 
financing for the projects. The local pool of funding is too shallow, and 
despite Chile's investment grade rating, foreign investors are not 
comfortable with the inherent long-term commitments. However, all is not 
dark. One group of investors, pension funds, may be more willing to take on 
sovereign exposure at home, as well as nearby countries. In Chile, pension 
funds are a 
viable component of financing for long-term domestic projects, such as 
satellite launches and fiber optic cabling, as well as roads to potential 
markets. As pension funds grow, cross-border investments may become 
commonplace, especially in the Andean and the Mercosur market. 
Chile boasts a healthy capital market, with about US$1 billion available for 
investment. But the traditional investors in these projects, the 
aforementioned pension funds, and the insurance companies, operate under 
restrictions that keep most deals out of reach-even the construction phase is 
considered to risky. 
Despite pension funds and an ever-growing list of finance sources for 
infrastructure projects, developers still rely significantly on the participation 
of multilaterals such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
World Bank's private sector affiliate. An alternative is to seek foreign funds, 
but these too are hampered by restrictions from the Central Bank. (The most 
notorious of these is the 30 percent one-year non-interest bearing reserve on 
foreign investment funds entering the country-costs that would apply to any 
further refinancing of a project.) The biggest barrier, however is the 
currency exchange risk. Due to the long-term nature of infrastructure 
projects, there are no instruments that will hedge a 15-20 year currency 
exposure. 
The Frei administration is taking steps to improve funding for Chilean 
infrastructure projects. Cash flow may now be used as debt collateral; banks 
may invest 15 percent (up from 10 percent) of their assets in these projects; 
and projects may be evaluated faster. But, fears of a second "Tequilla" (or 
in this case "Pisco") shock that followed the Mexico peso crisis of 1994, 
and memories of Chile's own crisis in the early 1980s continues to dissuade 
officials from any aggressive liberalization of Chile's strict securities 
regulations. 
Infrastructure needs in Chile may plague the speed at which the pay-TV 
market in Chile blossoms, but there are other signs that in the 
long-term, Chile will be a strong market. For instance, Chile has become a 
pioneer in Latin America by tackling one of economic development's most 
difficult problems-education. In June 1996, Chile announced a major 
initiative to address the country's educational system by setting goals to 
increase productivity, reduce inequality, and assure the sustainability of 
Chile's famed economic miracle. The education reform project calls for 
increased teacher accountability and an end to two shifts in public schools; 
instruction time will also increase by one-third. Once the reform is finished, 
Chilean schoolchildren will have as many instruction hours as their 
counterparts in East Asia. The reform will affect 9,000 public schools at a 
cost of about 3 percent of current government expenditures. What does this 
mean for the pay-TV industry? Plenty. The pay-TV industry needs an 
educated (and thus, often more wealthy) populace to beam its programming 
too. Chile's reforms in the long-term will increase viewership, and possibly 
competition. A well-educated workforce will also provide better service and 
could create a bigger market for original productions which could increase 
market share for networks looking to provide operators with exclusive 
programming. 
Another feather for Chile's cap is its workforce. Any firm looking to enter 
the pay TV business must consider labor concerns for two reasons. The first 
is the firm will need employees, the second is that they need to enter a 
country where workers can afford their service. Chile succeeds on both 
counts. The minimum monthly salary for Chilean workers is Ps 58,900 (Ps 
407: US$1); adjusted on an ad hoc basis. (Large foreign firms pay more). 
Chile's worker wages and productivity are up, which raises the odds that the 
number of consumers with the requisite amount of expendable income to 
support a pay-TV market is increasing. The average hourly wage index rose 
by over 12 percent in December 1995, versus a year earlier. However, 
consumer prices increased by over 8 percent, cutting the real wage increase 
to just over 4 percent. The highest rises were in services (16 percent), 
construction (16 percent), and commerce (13 percent). Labor productivity 
grew by a record +7 percent in 1995, with the largest jumps in agriculture 
(11 percent) and commerce (10 percent). However, a fall of almost 2 
percent was registered in financial services. Labor productivity for 1970-
1993 was strong. The annual percentage change for 1970-80 was 0.5 
percent, for 1980-90, -0.2 percent, for 1990-3, 3.8 percent. 
Another labor issue to consider along with wages is how many people are 
being paid those wages. In 1990 the average urban unemployment for Chile 
was 6.5 percent. The 1995 estimated showed that this number had 
diminished to an estimated 5.6 percent. Unemployment fell to the lowest 
level it has been in 25 years in 1996, 6.4 percent. However, tighter 
government policies have slowed the rate of wage growth. For the first time 
since 1996, wage rises were under 10 percent in the year to December. The 
slackening of real wage growth will boost the profitability of exporters, but 
consumer demand will suffer. It is possible that the sporadic outbreaks 
of unrest that plagued the public sector and mining unions in 1996 will 
recur in 1997. Although labor-force growth continues to exceed population 
growth, the gap between the two is decreasing. In Chile, the average annual 
growth of the labor force (1991-2000, %) is 1.8. The average annual 
population change (1990-95, %) is 1.6. The percentage of the population 
under 15 years (1995 figure) was 29.5. 
A possible direct problem for operators, and indirect for programmers is the 
possibility of growing labor conflict. If strikes in the pay-TV service 
industry were to occur operators would be directly affected, and 
programmers, because the operators they sell to are in trouble could be 
indirectly affected. The chance that strikes will occur is slim, but must be 
considered. For ten years, Chile's unions have been dominated by compliant 
Christian Democrats. However, elections in the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores (CUT), Chile's largest grouping of labor unions, will usher in 
hard-line former communists and socialists. Chile has set the pace in 
Latin American reforms for two decades, and the radical deregulation of the 
labor market was one of the pacesetters. Now, however, the knot in the tug-
of-war rope may be nearing labor's side. Chile's sustained economic growth 
is making it ever harder to deny requests to alleviate austerity measures by 
restoring some union privileges. There have been signs if mild labor 
activity. The number of workers involved in strikes rose from nearly 16,000 
to nearly 25,000 in 1994-1995, although the number of stoppages fell 
slightly. However, the possibility remains that activity will increase if 
workers feel that their rights to bargain collectively and strike are not 
protected. 
As regards the possibility of a future shakeout of the market, pay-TV firms 
must also focus on competition policy in Chile. Chile works hard to 
establish itself as a bastion of free trade and open markets in Latin America. 
However, in the regulation of monopolies it comes up lacking. In many 
sectors businesses rely on established loopholes and the indecision of the 
country's anti-monopoly commissions to merge or team together as they 
please. The end result is that consumers lose out. However, the 
situation also generates risk for companies. This is not because the current 
regulatory framework creates a lack of predictability, rather it is because 
future reforms may move towards tougher competition laws with potentially 
adverse implications for the profitability of established firms. This is only 
likely in the medium to long term, but it has relevance to the cable 
television industry in that firms tend to start joint ventures, or try to corner a 
particular aspect of the market (premium channels, pay-per-view, low-
income sectors) and may, in the future find themselves backed into a corner 
with an expensive fight on their hands. At present however, there is little 
impetus for change. The business community and the government are 
happy, although cases are developing (in the forestry sector, for instance) 
which may draw attention to the system's shortcomings. 
The bulk of Chile's anti-monopoly legislation was put into place just after 
Pinochet took power in December 1973. Most if its language is fuzzy, and 
thus loopholes exist which permit a number of monopolies to exist. The 
legislation calls the following illegal:  
●     Price-fixing; Production or distribution quotas or zones; 
●     Establishing exclusive agencies for marketing specific products; 
●     Obstructing the labor market. 
Compliance is monitored by an independent watchdog agency, Fiscalía, 
which provides two anti-monopoly commission to hear cases: the 
Prevention Commission and the Resolution commission. In the first 
instance, cases the Prevention Commission investigates and adjudicates. 
Appeals go to the Resolution Commission. The final level of recourse is 
Chile's Supreme Court. The complex structure is a lawyer's delight. 
The composition of the anti-monopoly agencies is part of the problem. 
Membership is determined by law, which requires that a certain number of 
lawyers and university deans serve on each commission. Business 
experience is not a prerequisite, and member are volunteers with no 
technical support, which can lead to poorly arrived at decisions. The 
underlying problem is the apparent lack of a strong desire for change. 
Businesses know what legal hoops (or loopholes) they must leap through 
and are apparently not interested in a more stringent process (the hoops may 
be smaller and harder to jump through). Also, the government is not 
disposed at present to pick a battle with corporate interests-the bulk of right-
wing opposition. 
Programming and Advertising Issues 
Because we are concerned with programming for a entry market, that is to 
say with programming for Chile which should be successful in other regions 
of Latin America, it is important to note the most successful programming 
in Latin America thus far has been: sports broadcasting, music television, 
children's programming, cartoons, adult programming, news and 
documentaries, movies and science fiction, and telenovelas. A description 
of each type of programming with an analysis of its potential in Chile 
follows. 
Sports broadcasting is an excellent program choice for a channel looking to 
move from the lead market stage to the pan-regional stage. The history, and 
success, of sports broadcasting has shown that launching a pan-regional 
channel does not mean much if local needs are not considered . An example 
of this is one of the most widely distributed pay-TV networks in Latin 
America, ESPN. The network entered Latin America in 1989 as a pan-
regional service transmitted simultaneously in English, Spanish, and 
Portuguese. Local feeds were launched soon thereafter, and an entirely 
separate channel was set up for Brazil. There are now 8 million subscribers 
to ESPN in Latin America, up 20 percent over last year. Ad sales have been 
equally brisk as the pan-regional idea is making its way to ad agencies who 
realize that pan-regional sports networks offer an excellent opportunity to 
address a broad range of customers. A sports broadcasting network for 
Chile could focus on sports such as soccer and snow-skiing that are 
prevalent and popular in the country. It could also utilize the competitive 
nature of Chile and its neighboring countries by highlighting sports events 
where the teams come from opposing countries. 
Music television is another successful programming format that should be 
considered for the Chilean market. MTV, the industry leader in music 
programming, has two different programming blocks in Latin America, one 
for the Mercosur market, and another for Mexico and Central America. The 
service features video jockeys from Chile, Argentina, and Mexico who 
showcase videos from a mixture of local, regional, and international bands. 
A competing music television station for Chile could focus more on local 
and regional bands, giving the network an exclusivity factor. 
Cable marketers looking to go international know that cute and 
noncontroversial children's programming, is a successful path. The Chilean 
market is no different. However, such a strategy is not infallible, 
controversy can stem from what a large section of America would agree is 
entirely innocent. An example is Porky Pig. In the United States he is a 
charmer; in many parts of Muslim Asia he is an anathema. Consequently, 
Turner's Cartoon Network has pulled him from that region of the world. 
Chile has its own ghosts and cultural norms, and these must both be known 
and treated with care. The reason for the caution is simple: Like many 
emerging markets, the population of both Chile and its fellow Latin 
Americancountries is young. More than 30 percent of the cable market in 
Latin America is under the age of 15. A network looking to break into the 
Chilean market would be smart to invest in local production of popular 
Chilean children's stories and issues rather than Spanish dubbed reruns of U.
S. programs. Cartoons are related to children's programming, but are 
actually aimed at kids of all ages. If the success of Turner Broadcasting's 
Cartoon Network is a sign, cartoons could be a boom market for Chile. The 
Cartoon Network has 7 million total viewers in Latin America, with a 20 
percent to 30 percent annual growth in terms of ad sales. 
Adult-oriented programming is a supersensitive genre, especially in a strong 
Catholic country, but that does not deter programmers from formulating 
plans to go beyond U.S. borders. Adult networks such as Playboy and the 
Spice network have seen success in Latin America. If properly controlled 
(available as a monthly subscription or on a PPV basis) other adult 
programming, specifically programming aimed at an audience which 
reflects the Chilean population, could succeed. 
News and documentaries networks are among the most prevalent and 
successful programmers in Latin America. For Chile, a news or 
documentary network that focused solely on Chilean news (or regional or 
global news from a Chilean perspective) could gain an exclusivity factor 
that could bring success. Similar channels could then be started in the pan-
regional area. 
The most popular avenue for movies and science fiction are the premium 
channels beamed in from U.S. networks after they have been dubbed into 
Spanish or Portuguese. For Chile two options exist. Create exclusivity 
among operators by creating a premium channel that is only available 
through one operator, or to create a channel which highlights Chilean and 
other Latin American countries cinema. 
Telenovelas are the biggest source of original production revenues for Latin 
America. Chile's university run stations and the national governments 
stations compete with each other on w weekly basis for the original 
production telenovela market. The potential exists for a pay TV network to 
provide Chile with telenovelas from both Chile and other Latin American 
countries. 
Despite the myriad of programming option, cable programmers looking 
longingly at the Chilean cable television market will have to know what is 
happening there before they go. Audiences scrutinize what is shown to 
them, and especially, what they allow to be shown to their families. Adult 
fare (a potential big moneymaker) can be taboo in many places. Even news, 
games, religious programming and cartoons have to be edited with cultural 
sensitivity in mind. 
Parents are not the only group for programmers and operators to fear. 
Chile's FCC equivalent, the Consejo Nacional de Television (CNT) decided 
in October of 1995 to regulate the content of pay TV. Prior to this time it 
had lacked the funds to do so. The Supreme Court has even debated whether 
the CNT, which regulates free TV, has the right to control cable. 
A debate was sparked when Latin American cable network HBO Ole aired 
"Basic Instinct" in 1994. Cable subscribers all over Chile tuned in, only to 
be met by the following notice: "Following regulations and a suggestion by 
the Cable TV Assn., the program for this timeslot has been suspended." The 
reason: in 1994 films classified for adult audiences (over 18) may be shown 
only after 10 p.m. whether on broadcast or cable. The CNT considered 
penalties against such networks as HBO Ole (for the Bruce Willis film, 
"Striking Distance"); Turner's TNT (for Francis Ford Coppola's "Rumble 
Fish"); MTV Latino (for Aerosmith's video for "Livin' on the Edge). 
Under CNT's plan, staffer's spend a week viewing film, children's and 
music channels from one Santiago system and one provincial system per 
month. Their findings go to a supervisor who affirm if violations exist and 
then file formal reports to the CNT board. Within five days, these regulators 
decide if charges will be brought. Charges can include pornographic content 
or excessive violence, but the most common violation is the ten o'clock rule. 
The problem is deciding what is adult content. 
If a charge is leveled, the cable operators may present a defense. If this fails 
a fine, suspension, or annulment of the operator's license can be levied. The 
accused then have the right to appeal in court-all the way to the supreme 
court. On October 31, 1995 five Christian Democrat Congressman 
presented a writ to the Court of Appeals, claiming the CNT was interfering 
with constitutional rights. In January of 1996 this was thrown out because 
the court felt the CNT was responsible for regulating all television. This 
was appealed to the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of the pay-TV industry in Latin America is both bright and 
volatile. As this paper has shown, country markets are becoming saturated 
and a market shakeout and subsequent restructing are expected. U.S. firms 
would be wise to recognize the differences between markets in individual 
Latin American countries such as Chile, and the rest of the pan-regional 
market. As this paper has also shown, a firm that is focused on the political, 
economic and cultural risks of Chile will find a comparatively secure 
market from which to get a headstart on the competition that is focused 
largely on the more saturated markets of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. 
Opportunities exits in Chile, both to grow by expanding programming 
options and exclusivity, and to stay secure by investing in a strategic 
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